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Rational choice and the original position:
the (many) models of Rawls
and Harsanyi
Gerald Gaus and John Thrasher

2.1 The original position and rational justification
2.1.1 The Fundamental Derivation Thesis
At the outset of Tf Rawls closely links the theory of justice to the theory of
rational choice:
one conception of justice is more reasonable than another, or justifiable
\\Tith respect to it. if rational persons in the initial situation would choose its
principles over those of the other for the role of justice. Conceptions of
justice are to be ranked by the acceptability to persons so circumstanced.
Understood in this way the question of justification is settled by \Vorking
out a problem of deliberation: we have to ascertain which principles it
would be rational to adopt given the contractual situation. This connects
the theory of justice with the theory of rational choice. (TJR, p. 16)
Indeed, Rawls proclaims that "the theory of justice is part, perhaps the nwst
significant part, of the theory of rational choice" (T]R, p. 15, emphasis added;
see section 2.2.3 below). Many have refused to take this claim literally (or even
seriously), by, for example, interpreting the original position analysis as a
heuristic for identifying independently true moral principles (see Dworkin,
"Original Position," p. 19 and Barry, Theories, pp. 271-82). In this chapter we
take this fundamental claim of Rawls at face value. We thus shall defend:
The Fundamental Derivation Thesis: the justification of a principle of
justice J derives from the conclusion that, under conditions C. ] is the
rational choice of chooser(s) P.

On the Fundamental Derivation Thesis that J is the rational choice of P under
C is neither evidence that J is the correct principle nor a \Vay of us appreciating
or seeing that J is just. Rather
.iustification is derivative of
status as P's
rational choice; moral justification derives from justification qua rational
choice. Notice that we do not say that f s justification is entirely derivative
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of rational choice justification, for the set of the conditions C under which the
choice is made (including those that identify the feasible choice set) also has
justificatory relevance.
The Fundamental Derivation Thesis also sets aside the interpretation of the
original position as fundamentally justifying through appeal to hypothetical
consent. Consent is not, strictly speaking, ever a concern for Rawls or for any
original position theorist. When Rawls tell us that his "aim [is) to present a
conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of
abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract'' (TJR, p. 10), we should
not read him as saying that because ] would be the object of consent by
P under C, ] is justified. At most, insofar as we might be tempted to read any
claims about hypothetical consent into an original position argument (and we
certainly need not), the relevant claim would be that the demonstration that
] would be the object of consent by P under C shows that J is the rational
choice of P, and it is this latter claim that is truly justificatory. Rawls never
says that the theory of justice is part of the theory of rational consent.
Henceforth we shall entirely set aside questions of consent.

2.1.2 The attraction of the Fundamental Derivation Thesis
Our aim in this chapter is not to defend the Fundamental Derivation Thesis
as a philosophic commitment in theorizing about justice, but rather to show
how the two most famous original position arguments - those of John Rawls
and John Harsanyi - seek to follow through on it in their justifications.
Nevertheless, unless the reader has at least some appreciation of the thesis's
appeal, the exercise might seem pointless.
It is essential to appreciate that the Fundamental Derivation Thesis is part of
a view of moral enquiry according to which models such as the original
position are not epistemological, helping us to find "moral truth interpreted
as fixed by a prior and independent order of objects and relations"; the original
position is part of "the search for reasonable grounds for reaching agreement
rooted in our conception of ourselves and our relation to society. The task is to
articulate a public conception of justice that all can live ·with,, (CP, p. 306).
Given this, the crux of moral enquiry is to find common reasonable grounds for
accepting a conception of justice. From his earliest work, however, Ralvis
insisted that we have conflicting ideas and intuitions about justice; arguments
based on such intuitions are typically "unconvincing. They are not likely to lead
to an understanding of the basis of justice" (CP, p. 52). Thus in the search
for reasonable agreement we are led to build on a more widely shared

--
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understanding of justification - rational choice. In employing an original
position argument, we suppose only that people are capable of rational choice:
they know and can act on their own interests and are capable of figuring out the
likely consequences of their various choices and so on. If the justification of the
principles of justice derives from this prosaic, common, notion of rational
choice, then we can say that the principles pass the identification test: actual
persons, with their own interests can verify and identify with the rationality of
the principles (Gauthier, Atforals, pp. 325ff.) That is, each can see that she too
would choose them under conditions of impartiality, and so can rationally
identify with them. Consulting only her deliberative rationality, each sees the
principles as rational. We might say that in a diverse society, the justificatory
force of rational choice is our only common touchstone.
But, of course, not all rational choices constitute choice of a conception of
justice. In addition to the identification test, the principles chosen in the
original position must be recognizably principles of justice. To be principles
of justice they must pass what we might call a recognitional test of choice in
that each can confirm that the principles are chosen from an impartial moral
point of view, and so qualify as bona fide principles of justice (Gauthier,
Morals, Chapter 8).
Thus as a model of justification, the original position has two links, one to
the moral point of view and the other to the point of view of actual rational
individuals. Justification in the original position succeeds if the principles are
chosen from a genuinely moral point of view and a rational individual can
endorse them. Without the identification test, the critics of the original position
would be right to see it as a complicated mechanism for generating impartial
principles that do not really derive their force from rational choice (they are
not what any rational agent would choose in those circumstances). Similarly,
lv'ithout the recognitional test, we could not be sure that the principles chosen
by rational individuals in the original position were principles of justice rather
than merely principles of, say, prudence or a "modus vivendi." We need to
confirm that from the moral point of view, these are the rational principles of
justice - that they would be chosen by an impartial legislator. Both links are
essential and it is the combination of these two types of rational choice that
gives original position arguments their distinctiveness and their power.

2.1.3 A social contract or an Archimedean perspective?
A long-standing question concerning Rawls's original position argument is
whether the ide-a of a "contract" is otiose, \\cith the real Justificatory work being
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done by the account of a rational choice of a single chooser. Soon after the
publication of TJ, Sidney Alexander claimed:
The contractarian aspect of Rawls's device is not essential, it is even
misleading. What is essential, I think, is the choice aspect. Whatever
worthwhile principles Rawls can validly deduce from his social contract
mechanism can also be deduced as the principles that a single rational man
would choose, from behind the veil of ignorance, for a social system in
which he was to be assigned a role after that choice. Rawls does not need
the contractual aspect, as is clear from his observation that the principles
would be chosen unanimously. ("Social Evaluation," p. 604)
Rawls responds to Alexander with a number of reasons why he thinks the
concept of a contract is essential: (1) it "reminds" us that separateness of
persons is fundamental to justice as fairness; (2) a contract "introduces
publicity conditions"; and (3) "reaching a unanimous agreement without a
binding vote is not the same thing as everyone's arriving at the same choice or
forming the same intention" (CP, p. 249). None of these considerations strikes
us as especially compelling; Alexander is surely correct that the critical
justification is that under conditions C the principle J would be rationally
chosen, and this choice can be modeled as that of a single individual,
P. Crucially, as Rawls acknowledges, there are "no differences to negotiate"
(CP, pp. 249 and 120), and so the choice in the original position is rational in
the sense of the norms of rational individual parametric choice, not, say, noncooperative game theory with its strategic reasoning, cooperative bargaining
theory, or principles of aggregation. This is the truly fundamental point: once
difference has been eliminated, the justification in the original position is via
an individual principle of rational parametric choice.
We thus shall take original position arguments as necessarily seeking to
reduce the choice of principles of justice to the rational parametric choice of
one individual. We thus set aside an account such as Ken Binmore's Natural
Justice, according to which there is bargaining in the original position. 1 As we
shall understand it, an original position argument seeks to provide what
Rawls (CP, p. Sll) and David Gauthier have described as an "Archimedean
point" for judging society:

1

Although he does not describe himself as an original position theorist, Gauthier's lvfornb
contractarian account qualifies. If space allowed, examining his view would be especially
enlightening, since so few readers appreciate its strong commitment to an Archimedean moral
choice.
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Archimedes supposed that given a sufficiently long lever and a place to
stand, he could move the earth. We may then think of an Archimedean
point as one from which a single individual may exert the force required to
move or affect some object. In moral theory, the Archimedean point is that
position one must occupy, if one's own decisions are to possess the moral
force to govern the moral realm. From the Archimedean point one has the
moral capacity to shape society. (Morals, p. 233)
The original position comprises such an Archimedean point, where the rational
parametric choice of one individual determines the principles of justice.

2.2 The evolution of Rawls's original position

2.2.1 The early model
As does Robert Paul Wolff in his excellent analysis Understanding Rawls, we

identify several different versions of Rawls's original position model. Rawls
first advances an initial position choice model in his 1958 "Justice as
Fairness" for evaluating the justice of established social practices
( CP, p. 52). In this model of the original position, Rawls's agents are not,
strictly speaking, deliberating about first principles of justice from, as it
were, an atemporal ..view from nowhere." As Rawls writes, "there is no
question of our supposing them to come together to deliberate as to how
they will set these practices up for the first time" ( CP, p. 53 ). The practices
are taken to already exist. Instead, the agents are deliberating about whether
any of them has a "legitimate complaint" against the practices (CP, p. 53). In
so doing, they must also develop standards for legitimate versus illegitimate
complaints, and these standards shape what will ultimately be the principles
of justice.
Rawls attributes a fairly narrow utility function to the choosers: individuals
are mutually disinterested, evaluating the practice in question simply on the
basis of whether they believe it will be to their advantage (CP, p. 52). This is
not a claim about the nature of humans, but a model of what a certain sort of
rational actor would choose. Rawls's 1958 choosers
are rational: they know their O'lkl1 interests more or less accurately; they
are capable of tracing out the likely consequences of adopting one practice
rather than another. they are capable of adhering to a course of action
once they have decided upon it; they can resist present temptation and the
enticements of immediate gain; and the bare knowledge or perception of
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the difference between their condition and that of others is not, within
certain limits and in itself, a source of great dissatisfaction. (CP, p. 52)
Rawls also assumes that they are situated in such a way that they have
roughly similar abilities and needs and can benefit from cooperation
(CP, p. 53). They normally are unable to dominate one another, thus
ensuring that they have an interest in finding common principles (Wolff,
Understanding, pp. 28-9).
That said, the precise specification of the preferences of the choosers in
"Justice as Fairness" is unclear. Rawls claims that individuals \\rill choose
principles of justice for a practice where each has a conception of "legitimate
claims,, that it is reasonable for others to acknowledge (CP, p. 59). He also
writes that in a just practice persons "can face one another openly and
support their respective positions, should they appear questionable, by reference to principles which it is reasonable to expect each to accept" (CP, p. 59).
All of this is somewhat vague; it leads to substantive constraints on what sorts
of principles will be acceptable without fully specifying the basis of the choice
in the original position. That is, the preferences of the choosers are set out as
self-interested without specifying how that self-interest constrains their utility
functions. As Rawls notes, this means that the subject of their agreement '""rill
be "very general indeed" (CP, p. 57).
The principles that they would endorse, according to Rawls, are: ( 1) each
has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty
for all and (2) inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that
they will work to everyone's advantage and that positions and offices are open
to all (CP, p. 48). We can see the first principle as setting out a baseline of
equality in rights or liberties and the second principle as justifying certain
deviations from equality. The second principle endorses what we might call a
strong Pareto condition that a move from a more equal to a less equal social
state is justified if everyone is better off in the less equal state. At this point,
Rawls's description of the choosers and their information sets provides no
grounds for a single rational ranking of the set of mutually beneficial social
states. Just states of affairs must be on the Pareto frontier, but this, in itself:
does not specify a point on the Pareto frontier that is uniquely just.
This version of the choice situation does not employ any "veil of ignorance"
to eliminate knowledge of an individual's capacities and interests. A veil of
ignorance excludes from choosers' information sets knowledge of their identity, introducing uncertainty as to what choice is in their best interests. In the
early model Rawls introduces uncertainty in another way:
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They each understand further that the principles proposed and aclmowledged on this occasion are binding on all future occasions. Thus each will
be wary of proposing a principle which would give him peculiar advantage,
in the present circumstances, supposing it is accepted. Each person knows
that he will be bound by it in future circumstances the peculiarities of
which cannot be known, and which might well be such that the principles
are to his disadvantage. ( CP) p. 53)
Here the argument is that, because he is bound by the choice of the principles
over an extended period of time regulating circumstances that he cannot
predict, a rational person will not seek to tailor the principles so that he gains
undue advantages given his present circumstances, since these may unpredictably change, and he may end up on the losing end of rigged or inegalitarian principles. Note that this argument seeks to secure some of the results
that the veil of ignorance achieves in the later formulations: it requires that a
person seeks principles that are what Kohlberg was later to call "reversible":
one can endorse them regardless of the position one occupies under them
(Moral Development, pp. 190-201).
Rawls is proposing here a version of maximin reasoning. He immediately
explains the upshot of his principle for choice under ignorance: "The restrictions which would so arise might be thought of as those a person would keep
in mind if he were designing a practice in which his enemy would assign him
his place" (CP, p. 54). This claim is striking; it is repeated in various formulations of the original position, including ~'Distributive Justice" (published in
1967) (CP, p. 133n) and as late as TJR (pp. 132-3). What is so striking is that
these are the only sentences in which Rawls seems tempted to introduce
multi-person strategic reasoning into the original position, even though he
immediately adds "the persons in the original position do not, of course,
assume that their position in society is decided by a malevolent opponent"
(TJR, p. 133).
What is going on ¥lith this unusual appeal to strategic reasoning? Recall
that the definitive argument for maximin reasoning was presented by John
von Neumann, who showed maximin to be the general solution to zero-sum
games (Theory of Garnes, pp. 153f[) 2 In a zero-sum, nvo-person game, any
gain for one player implies an equal loss for the other; if we tally up all the
2

Rawls cities this work in note 9 of "Justice as Fairness~ (CP, p. 56) but does not direct us to
specific pages. He d0t.°'S. though. indicate that readers should consult the Luce and Raiffa
Games chapters on tv:o-person cooperative games and group dedsion·making. Rawls always
recognized that his choice situation was not, in the end, properly modeled in zero-sum terms.
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gains and all the losses, the sum will always be zero. The quintessential
example is a game between enemies, where one player's gain is the reverse
side of the other's loss. So if we did think of the original position as a zeros um game, then maximin would be the uncontroversial solution. It almost
seems as if Rawls thinks this argument is too good not to mention, even
though in TJ he immediately rejects it as inappropriate.

2.2.2 The middle models
Rawls,s original position undergoes a series of substantial changes in what we
shall call the (Cmiddle models" - from «Distributive Justice" ( 1967) through
"Distributive Justice: Some Addenda" (1968) to TJ (1971). There are substantial shifts in: (1) the construction of the information sets; (2) the description
of the choosers; (3) the more explicit role of maximin as a principle of rational
choice; and (4) a switch in the role of maximin, from primarily an argument
for the egalitarian principle, to what seems to be the main argument in favor
of "the difference principle," which is itself introduced in the middle models.
We briefly consider each in turn.
( 1) The veil of ignorance is introduced in an effort to specify the original
position as a ((suitably defined initial situation'' wherein "no one knows his
position in society, nor even his place in the distribution of natural talents and
abilities" (CP, p. 132). Indeed, one knows nothing of one's own personal
utility function (one,s ends, goals, or values). Rawls describes this restriction
on the information of the choosers as justified to create a fair bargaining
problem. The veil prevents "anyone from being advantaged or disadvantaged
by the contingencies of social class and fortune" (CP, p. 132). According to
Rawls, this is essential to making his contract theory, and "ethics itself," a part
of "the general theory of rational choice" (CP, p. 132). Of course, in the
general theory of rational choice, there is no restriction on the knowledge that
choosers have about themselves or their fellows. Indeed, in most specifications
of rational choice, agents are assumed to have full information of their
circumstances. But, as we saw in the early model, Rawls is explicitly seeking
to develop a theory of rational choice under radical uncertainty, where the
uncertainty is intended to induce impartiality among rational choosers.
The veil of ignorance is critical in allowing us to see the choice from the
original position as an Archimedean point (§1.3), in which rational choice
must be made from an impartial point of view.
(2) Having eliminated personal knowledge about oneself, including know·
ledge of one's own aims, how is anyone to make a rational choice? As Rawls
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notes, rationality alone is not an adequate basis for rational choice of the
principles of right, since rationality only tells us to choose more of what is
preferred, not what we should prefer. It specifies means, not ends. Real
persons have interests, values, and goals - what Rawls calls a "conception of
the good" - that orders their rational life plans and their ends. Choosers
behind the veil lack knowledge of their conception of the good; they do not
know who they are, what their capacities and abilities are, and what they
value and care about. As Rawls argues, while his choosers "know that they
have some rational plan of life, they do not know the details of this plan,
the particular ends and interests which it is calculated to promote"
(T]R, p. 123). Without a specification of ends, however, rational choice seems
either impossible or chaotic: impossible if there is simply no basis for choice,
and chaotic if everyone in the original position makes spurious or random
assumptions about what they would want without the veil. In the second case,
once the veil is lifted, individuals from the point of view of what Rawls calls
"you and me" (PL, p. 28) would not have reason for seeing the principles
justified in the original position as having any normative force.
To solve this problem, Rawls introduces the notion of "primary goods."
Primary goods are goods of which it is reasonable to assume individuals want
more rather than less, regardless of whatever else they want Thus even behind
the veil, individuals know they will want to ma.ximize their primary goods. This
solves the deep concern that without some conception of the good, rational
choice behind the veil would be impossible. The introduction of primary goods
also considerably simplifies choice in the original position. Since everyone
wants more rather than fewer primary goods, and since all have the same
knowledge of their situation behind the veil, rational choice is characterized
so that "unanimity is possible; the deliberations of any one person are typical of
all" (TJR, p. 232). These elements of the original position (the veil restricting
information and the thin theory of the good) make the rational choice of the
"parties'' truly analogous to the rational choice of one suitably constructed
person, and so the choice is indeed a parametric choice of one person against a
background of fixed (non-strategic) options (§L3).
(3) The middle models 1-Vitness the rise of maximin - the rule that one
should choose the option whose worst outcome is better than the worst
outcome of all other options - as an explicit principle of rational choice
under uncertainty and, indeed, its prominent role in the overall argument.
Although, as we have said, Rawls continued to employ the zero-sum strategic
game imagery even into TJ, certainly by his 1967 essay on "Distributive
Justice" he was emphasizing maximin as a general principle for choice under
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uncertainty, at least under conditions of long-term commitment. Rawls
believed that the uncertainty engendered by the veil of ignorance makes
reliance on the maximin rule compelling.
This is not simply an idiosyncratic idea of Rawls's. In 1951 Leonard
Savage noted that the minimax principle was central to the theory of choice
when the actor cannot assign probabilities.3 In "Distributive Justice," Rawls
directs us to Luce and Raiffa' s discussion of maximin as a principle for choice
under uncertainty. However, the appeal of maximin waned in decision
theory as a preferred principle for choice under uncertainty after the 1950s
(e.g. McClennen, Rationality, pp. 25-8). Just what is the best principle for
rational choice under great uncertainty is a vexed issue, but certainly as
a general rule maximin seems unduly pessimistic. As Binmore quips, "only
a paranoiac would find maximin attractive in general" (Game Theory, p. 31).
Rawls denies that his use of maximin is based on any assumptions about
risk aversion (CP, p. 245), even though Rawls himself describes it as "conservative" (CP, p. 133n). In TJ Rawls contends that three features of the choice in
the original position make plausible reliance on this "unusual" rule. (i)
A distinctive feature of maximin is that it entirely discounts probabilities.
In the original position, choosing social structures and your position in them,
and in which you must justify this choice to others (say, your descendants), it
is reasonable to be highly skeptical of any probabilistic claims. (ii) Second,
('the person choosing has a conception of the good such that he cares very
little, if anything, for what he might gain above the maximin stipend that
he can, in fact, be sure of by following the maximin rule" (T]R, p. 134).
And relatedly, (iii) "the rejected alternatives have outcomes that one can
hardly accept. The situation involves grave risks,, (TJR, p. 134). The point
here is that the very special features of the choice in the original position, plus
further (rather strong) assumptions about the utility functions of the parties,

3

In von Neumann's analysis, a solution to a zero-sum game implied that maximin leads to the
same choice as minimax. Suppose Row and Column are playing a zero sum game, and payoffs
are stated in terms of Row's payoffs (in a zero-sum game only one player's payoffs need to be
stated, since the other player's payoffs are exactly the opposite). If Row goes first, he must
choose the row with the highest minimum (maximin), since he knows that Column will, from
the selected Row, choose the cell which gives Column the highest payoff, which is equivalent to
that which gives Row the lowest. So, like the parties in the original position, Row is concerned
with nothing but the lowest payoffs in each row. If Column goes first, she will choose the
column whose maximum payoff for Row is the smallest, since Column knows that once she
had chosen the column, Row will choose the cell that gives him the most. Thus the equilibrium
solution is one in which maximin = minimax.
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renders maximin a purely rational rule under the circumstances - one that
makes the most sense given the personal aims of the parties.
(4) One of the distinctive features of the middle models is that the
"maximin" criterion has two distinct meanings: as a principle of rational
choice and as a principle of equity ("Distributive Justice"). Although Rawls
would later come to hold that the "maximining" features of the rule of
rational choice and of equity (i.e. the difference principle) constitute simply
a "formal resemblance" that is "misleading" (JFR, p. 95), they certainly
seemed systematically linked in the middle models. In the early model the
second principle of justice was simply a strong Pareto condition that required
that justified inequalities must fall on the Pareto frontier of mutual benefit.
The principle, however, does not say anything about where on the Pareto
frontier society must settle. By the time Rawls writes "Distributive Justice,"
he sees this indeterminacy as a serious problem:
There are many such [Pareto-optimal] distributions, since there are many
ways of allocating commodities so that no further mutually beneficial
exchange is possible. Hence the Pareto criterion, as important as it is,
admittedly does not identify the best distribution, but rather a class of
optimal, or efficient distributions ... The criterion is at best an incomplete
principle for ordering distributions. (CP, p. 135)
Rawls is thus committed to specifying the second principle in a way that
makes a complete ordering of social alternatives possible from the point of
view of justice. Here the middle models introduce another innovation: the
choosers are now making their choices from the point of view of a representative member of a specific social class.
Since the veil excludes the knowledge of individual circumstances and
interests that choosers could use to maximize their expected outcome in the
society, Rawls argues that some particular social position needs to be selected
so that the choosers can maximize the expected outcome of that representative social class. He argues that the "obvious candidate is the representative
man of those who are least favored by the system of institutional inequalities"
(CP, pp. 137-8). Applying this analysis~ the agents in the original position will
choose a basic structure of society as just ""hen "'the prospects of the least
fortunate are as great as they can be" (CP, p. 138). In this formulation of
the second principle we have what he now calls the "difference principle."
To arrive at the difference principle. though, several more refinements or
assumptions are needed in the original position. These assumptions are
"chain-connection" and "dose-knittedness" (CP, p. 139). Rawls argues that
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we should assume that inequalities are "chain connected," i.e. "if an inequality
raises the expectation of the lowest position, it raises the expectation of all
positions in between" (CP, p. 139). Greater expectations for low-skilled
workers improve the prospects of higher-skilled workers. Relatedly, the
"close-knit" assumption claims that "it is impossible to raise (or lower)
the expectations of any representative man without raising (or lowering) the
expectation of every other representative man" (CP, p. 139). These assumptions, though empirically dubious, are essential to making this version of the
difference principle consistent with the earlier, Pareto version. If it is impossible to maximize the position of the least well off without at the same time
harming the better off, it is not clear that even those who did not know
their position in society would choose the least well off class as the representative chooser. Why not, after all, use the median class or the average
representative person as the position from which to maximize, rather than
the least well off? A critical reason must involve the maximin choice rule,
for the parties are primarily focused on the worst outcomes. It is no wonder
that (Rawls' s protestations notwithstanding) for most readers of TJ the task
of the maximin rule of choice is to justify the maximin rule of equity.

2.2.3 The final model: adieu to justice as rational choice?
In his original Dewey Lectures, in PL, and in ]FR, Rawls describes the original
position as a "device of representation" (CP, p. 308; PL, p. 48; ]FR, p. 17). The
specifications and, more importantly, the rationale, of the model change
again. The final model is meant to provide the answer to the question "how
is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and
equal citizens who still remain divided by reasonable religious, philosophical
and moral doctrines?" (PL, p. 47). To answer this, Rawls models the justification of principles of justice as what rational and reasonable agents would
choose if put into an original position where the diversity of their beliefs and
aims was abstracted away and, again, their only goal was to maximize
prospective social primary goods. In the final version a central aim is to
model the normative political implications of two relevant aspects of our
moral personality- our sense of justice (the reasonable) and our capacity for a
conception of the good (the rational) (PL, p. 52).
This approach to the justification of principles of justice seems a significant
departure from the middle models. In particular, the introduction of the
reasonable as a feature of the representatives in the original position appears
to signal that Rawls gave up on his bold claim that "the theory of justice is a
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part, perhaps the most significant part, of the theory of rational choice"
(TJR, p. 15). Rawls now insists that the project of deriving the reasonable
from the rational is misguided, but his renunciation is nuanced:
From what we have just said, this [the claim that justice is a part of the
theory of rational choice] is simply incorrect. What should have been said
is that the account of the parties, and of their reasoning, uses the theory
of rational decision, though only in an intuitive way. This theory is itself
part of a political conception of justice, one that tries to give an account
of reasonable principles of justice. There is no thought of deriving those
principles from the concept of rationality as the sole normative
concept. I believe that the text of Theory as a whole supports this interpretation. (PL, p. 53n)
Is Rawls truly renouncing the fundamental derivation claim (§1.1)? It
certainly is a mistake to think that his project in Tl was an attempt to derive
principles of justice from one normative concept, rationality; we concur that
Tl as a whole maizes this point clear. We have tried to show, however, that the
Fundamental Derivation Thesis, which is central to the rational choice
approach to ethics, does not claim that morality can be reduced to rational
choice and nothing else: as we have stressed, the circumstances C are also
fundamental. In the middle models, "reasonableness>) is entirely modeled by
the circumstances of the choice situation: they ensured that the rational
choice could be recognized as a moral choice (TJR, p. 514). In the final model,
although the reasonable continues to be primarily modeled by the circumstances of choice, Rawls more explicitly integrates some elements of the
reasonable into the description of the choosers themselves. This in itself
would be consistent with the Fundamental Derivation Thesis. However, the
claim that the rational choice only enters into the final model in an "intuitive
way" does suggest that, at least in Rawls's eyes, the Fundamental Derivation
Thesis has been abandoned, \'Vith rational choice demoted to something more
like a heuristic role.
Certainly in the evolution from the early to the final models, we can see a
clear movement. In the early model identification - the ability of actual
rational choosers to identify \'<ith the principles as clearly rational choices looks very strong. The principles are general and abstract, and do indeed seem
rational choices for cooperative schemes racing unknmm futures. But Rawls
clearly worried that the early model was lacking on the recognitional dimension: it was less dear that the contract was "moral". In addition, it did not
provide a complete ordering of social states, something that Rawls thought
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important to a theory of justice. We can thus understand Rawls' s later models
as seeking to enhance the recognitional features of the original position - to
show that it was a genuinely Archimedean point. Whether this enhancing of
recognition was ultimately at the cost of identification is, of course, a fundamental worry. Gauthier thought it was: as the models develop, the chooser
from the original position is so far removed from any preferences, capacities,
and talents that actual individuals have little idea of what it would mean to
identify with the choices of such a empty agent (Morality, p. 254).

2.3 Harsanyi's models
2.3.1 The original position model
There are three main differences between Rawls' s middle model (which we
take as the quintessential Rawlsian original position) and Harsanyi' s in the
way they construct the original position: ( 1) Harsanyi uses an expected utility
decision rule rather than maximin for choice in the original position; (2) util~
ities are directly compared across persons (not classes) in Harsanyi's original
position; and (3) choice in the original position selects a version of average
utilitarianism rather than the two principles as the rational principle of
justice. We will examine Harsanyi' s original position in some detail, and then
consider whether his model meets the conditions of an original position as we
have laid them out in the first section.
For Harsanyi, moral choice in the original position is a species of rational
choice, but rational choice over a very specific domain. Using utility theory.
he argues that individuals choose rationally under uncertainty when they
choose the prospects that will lead to the highest expected utility. In individual choice, these prospects and outcomes tend to be self-regarding or at least
partial to a person's concerns, friends, and family ("Morality," pp. 43-4).
Moral choice is distinctive because they are choosing not from their partial
point of view (on the basis of their utility function) but impartially over social
systems as a whole. In his most straightforward presentation Harsanyi
describes a social system, say a capitalist system, of having n = {1,2>3 ... }
possible social positions with specific utilities related to each ("Morality,"'
pp. 45-7). These are ranked so that social position U1 is better, from the
point of view of any given member of that society, than social position U2 and
so on. Choice from the moral point of view then can be modeled so that a
given individual i who does not know who she will be in that societv, would
seek to maximize the expected value of being in that society, assuming thaa
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there is an equal probability of being any person in the society. That is, the
chooser would maximize
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or the "arithmetic mean of all individual utility levels in society" ("Morality,"
p. 46). Not knowing who one would be, the impartial choice would be to
choose the highest expected average level of utility in the society. 4 In addition,
various different kinds of societies can be compared using this method.
We can, for instance, compare the expected average level of a capitalist versus
a socialist society given various assumptions.

2.3 .2 The axiomatic model

Harsanyi repeatedly claims ("Cardinal Utility," "Cardinal Welfare,") that his
choice of the average utility principle is a result of applying standard Bayesian
decision theory to choice in the original position, at one point stating that
Bayesian rationality conditions, combined with a "hardly controversial"
Pareto optimality condition, "entail utilitarian ethics as a matter of mathematical necessity" ("Morality," p. 233). But there are several essential features
of Harsanyi's model of choice in the original position that reflect his aim
of modeling specifically moral choice in the original position that deviate
from standard Bayesian decision theory. To see this, it is worth looking at
Harsanyfs axiomatic formulation of his model. There are four axioms that,
taken together, show that genuinely moral choice is made in the original
position (Rational Behavior, pp. 64-9):
1 rationality of moral preferences;
2 rationality of personal preferences;
3 positive relationship benveen the moral preferences of a person i and the
personal preferences of all of the members of society;
4 symmetry.

The first a.xiom specifies that any individual choosing over social states of
affairs would satisfy the standard requirements of Bayesian rationality, that is,

4

Harsanyi recognizes that real individuals would know their actual positions in society. The
critical point, he argues, is that a person's "value judgment will still qualify as a true moral
judgment as long as he judges these social situations essentially in the same way as he would
do if he did not have this information" (Rational Behavior, p. 50).
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that person would have a complete ordering suitable for Von NeumannMorgenstern transformation to a linear invariant cardinal utility scale. The
second holds that one's individual preference ordering would meet the basic
conditions of Bayesian utility theory. The third condition is a Pareto requirement for rational social choice. If all individuals in a society weakly prefer
option A to option B in their individual orderings, the moral or social
ordering should not rank option B over option A. Harsanyi argues that the
first two conditions are merely rationality requirements while the third is a
moral requirement, but one he thinks is "surely a rather non-controversial
moral principle" ("Bayesian Decision," p. 226).
The fourth condition, symmetry or what Harsanyi sometimes calls "equal
treatment," is more complicated. As Michael Moehler shows, the first three
conditions, taken together, entail weighted utilitarianism but do not generate
average utilitarianism and do not require interpersonal comparisons of utility
("Contractarian Ethics"). In this way, without the "equal treatment" condition, Harsanyi's description of the original position would generate a principle
that reflected impartiality in the original position, but it would not reflect
what he takes as fundamental to morality: universality and, more importantly,
impersonality ("Morality," pp. 39-41). The weight that individuals put on
their rankings of particular social states of affairs would be reflected in the
overall social utility function. With the introduction of the "equal treatment"
condition, all separate utility functions are given equal weight. Individuals
assign the same weights to alternative rankings of social states of affairs when
those rankings are made in the same utility units. This is not only a simplifying assumption: it has the substantive upshot that the only distinguishing
factor between different orderings of social states is the particular individual
names that would be associated with them. Individuals choose rationally in
the original position when they assume they might actually have any name
associated with a particular social position. Another way to put this is that
an impartial rational chooser in the original position weights all individual
utility functions equally. As we will see this is a key assumption for generating
the equiprobability assumption that generates the average rule utilitarian
conclusion.

2.3.3 Equiprobability and extended preferences

Harsanyi' s proof of the rationality of average utilitarianism relies on t\.vo
controversial assumptions: (1) the equiprobability assumption; and (2) interpersonal comparisons of utility or what he calls "extended preferences."
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The first assumes that individuals will assign equal probabilities, when they
are choosing in the original position, that they will occupy any social position
in the social world they are selecting. If one is evaluating a capitalist society,
for instance, one should place equal probability on person i, who is extremely
poor, and person j, who is extremely rich. If there are n individuals in a
society, a person in the original position will assign a probability of l/n that
she will be any particular person in that society (Rational Behavior,
pp. 49-50). One chooses as if one doesn't know whether one will be Alf the
teacher, Betty the factory owner, Charlie the laborer, or poor indigent Doris;
one assigns equal probability to each option.
Harsanyi assumes that since the choice is made under uncertainty, that is,
with no objective probability of being one person rather than another, the
correct principle of choice is to assign equal probabilities to all possibilities.
This is an application of Laplace's principle of indifference or insufficient
reason, that if one doesn't have any reason for assuming a particular probability of one outcome over another occurring, one should assign equal
probability to each outcome. As Binmore and others have pointed out,
however, this doctrine of indifference is more controversial and ambiguous
than it may initially seem (Rational Decisions, p. 128). If there are three horses
running a race and one has no basis for judging their ability to ·win, Binmore
asks, should one give the chance of a particular horse winning the probability
of VJ by indifference (since it is one of three horses), or should one assign it a
Vi probability of \Vinning (since the horse vrul either win Or lose and one has
no more reason to think it v"ill ·win or lose) (Rational Decisions, p. 129)?
How we apply the principle of indifference in this case determines how we
should bet, but the options are very different. The principle does not tell us
how to apply itself.
Indeed, Rawls argues "the parties have no basis for determining the probable nature of their society, or their place in it" (TJR. p. 134). We have seen
that Rawls argues that the parties would not use probability calculations at all,
even a principle of indifference, relying instead on ma.ximin. Rawls insists that
choice in the original position should be modeled as a choice under "complete
ignorance," not uncertainty, and the parties should, therefore, seek to protect
themselves and their families from the worst possibilities that might befall
them if they ended up in the lowest social role. Harsanyi ridicules Rawls's
argument against using probabilities in the original position, arguing that it
entails either ( 1) that we are forced to use a decision rule like ma.ximin
which is unsuited for rational choice under uncertainty and has absurd
conclusions or (2) that we are being inconsistent on the basis of standard
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Bayesian theories of rationality (Can the Maximin ?"). Harsanyi is quite right
to point out that in standard Bayesian decision theory, subjective priors can
be assigned to any gamble. The problem, as we have seen, is that the principle
of indifference does not unambiguously lead to the equiprobability assumption. This does not show that Rawls is correct to object to Harsanyfs
formulation of choice in the original position, only that the equiprobability
assumption is not a mere extension of Bayesian decision theory. In a later
essay, Harsanyi admits as much:
In its traditional form, the principle of indifference, also called the principle
of insufficient reason, asserts that when the conditions permit two or more
different outcomes, yet we have no evidence favoring any particular outcome over any other, we ought to assign the same probability to each
outcome. In this form, the principle is much too vague to be of any real use.
It is also open to the important logical objection that it attempts to draw a
positive conclusion (that of equal probabilities) from mere ignorance (from
absence of information favoring any specific outcome) - an attempt that
cannot possibly succeed. ("Objective Probabilities," p. 352)
Equiprobability is not an uncontroversial extension of Bayesian decision
theory: it is a substantive moral assumption that makes choice in the original
position impersonal as well as impartial ("Contractarian Ethid'). Harsanyi
takes both of these conditions to be essential components of the moral point
of view ("Bayesian Decision," p. 227).
In addition to equiprobability, Harsanyi's original position model also
assumes interpersonal comparisons of utility. As with the equiprobabillty
assumption, this is part of the "equal treatment" or symmetry assumption in
the axiomatic model (section 2.3.2). Harsanyi justifies reliance on interpersonai
utility comparisons as an application of what he calls "imaginative empathy"'
("Morality," p. 50). We empathize with others by imagining ourselves in their
position and thinking how we would evaluate a state of affairs if we were them:
We imagine ourselves to be in the shoes of another person, and ask
ourselves the question, "if I were now really in his position, and had his
tastes, his education, his social background, his cultural values, and his
psychological make-up, then what would now be my preferences benveen
various alternatives, and how much satisfaction or dissatisfaction \vould i
derive from any given alternative? ("Morality," p. SO)
Harsanyi argues that this imaginative empathy is not philosophically prob.
lematic for two reasons. First, human beings are so alike in psychology and so
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similarly situated that it is reasonable to think that we can actually empathize
with others in this way. Second, he contends that in any case we must
make interpersonal comparisons when we are making moral evaluations.
Notice that Harsanyi is certainly making substantive modeling choices when
he introduces equiprobability and interpersonal comparisons into his original
position.
'lF:.i-§.!f?

2.3.4 Identification and recognition
Does Harsanyi's original position meet the recognitional and identification
conditions! Rawls denies that it meets the recognitional test, maintaining that
the problem with utilitarianism and any view that makes the principles of
justice the result of the rational choice of one impartial and impersonal
observer is that they mistake impartiality for impersonality (TJR, p. 166).
Impartial choice does not favor any particular point of view, but impersonal
choice does not respect the separateness of persons and merges the distinct
individuals of a society into one aggregative utility function. Much depends
here on just what one thinks is characteristic of the moral point of view.
A more serious problem arises with the identification test. Regardless of
whether impersonality is a reasonable assumption of choice from the moral
point of view, it is hard to see how actual individuals could identify with the
choice of an agent choosing to maximize average utility, rather than maximizing the expected utility of any particular person. As Gauthier points out,
in Harsanyi's original position "the ideal actor, in maximizing expected
average utility, is not maximizing expected utility - her mvn or that of anyone
else" (Morals, p. 243). In moving from the rational choice of an agent
maximizing her expected utility to the choice of maximizing expected average
utility Harsanyi has "broken the link ensuring that each person would identify" with the chooser in the original position (Aforals, p. 244). Put another
way, actual individuals would not see the reasons of the chooser in Harsanyf s
original position as reflecting their reasons. In this way, the justificatory link
between the model of rational choice in the original position and the reasons
of actual individuals in society would be severed. Individuals vvill not see
Harsanyi's justification of average utility as a justification for them. If this is
correct, Harsanyi's original position \¥ill not pass the identification test even if
it does pass the recognition test. This is an independent reason for thinking
that impersonality, as Harsanyi models it, is not a suitable standard for
modeling moral choice in the original position.
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2.4 Conclusion: rational choice and the Archimedean chooser

Why did Rawls and Harsanyi spend so much effort developing principles of
rational choice for an Archimedean chooser - a chooser whose position is so
constrained that his purely rational choice defines the moral realm for us all?
Fundamental to any answer is a loss of faith that in a deeply pluralistic society
the traditional sources of moral convictions - religion, tradition, or the moral
insight of the elite - could provide the basis of a conception of morality or
justice c'that all can live with" (CP, p. 306). For this to be the case, each must
be able to project himself into the Archimedean position. In doing so, he must
confirm that he recognizes this as a genuine basis for moral choice and that he
would choose in the way the theory indicates. As we have shown, these are
difficult criteria to meet simultaneously. Both Rawls and Harsanyi sought to
satisfy the recognitional criterion, providing an Archimedean position that
could definitely impartially order feasible social states. In order to accomplish
this, however, they developed choosers who possessed no determinate utility
functions, who were stripped of capacities, interests, and aims. And, in
addition, both resorted to highly contentious principles of rational choice maximin and equiprobability. Real individuals, considering their own concerns and aims are apt to find these versions of the "moral point of view"
alien: who knows what one would choose, with all knowledge of all aspects of
one's individuality shorn away? We believe that Rawls's early model, in spite
of its vagueness and indeterminacy, provides a more promising basis for
connecting a rational Archimedean choice to real individual choices. That is
a claim we shall have to vindicate elsewhere.

